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OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
This is our first opportunity to confront the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (“EMTALA” or the
“Act”). 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, et seq. Among other things, the
Act forbids hospitals from refusing to treat individuals with
emergency conditions, a practice often referred to as “patient
dumping.”
Appellants Christopher and Honey Torretti’s son,
Christopher, was born with severe brain damage after Mrs.
Torretti’s high-risk pregnancy went awry. On the morning of
the birth, Mrs. Torretti went to her routine outpatient fetal
monitoring appointment at a perinatal facility. The attending
medical personnel at the facility directed her to her primary
hospital for extended perinatal monitoring. She gave birth to
Christopher shortly after arriving at the hospital. The Torrettis
sued the hospitals and doctors involved under EMTALA, as
well as state statutory and common-law claims. This appeal
tests the boundaries of EMTALA, which is not a federal
malpractice statute. Given these circumstances, relief for
Christopher Torretti’s traumatic brain injuries may be available
in other forms, but is not provided under EMTALA. Thus, we
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affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.1
I.

Background

This case, like most cases brought under EMTALA, is
tragic. This was Mrs. Torretti’s second pregnancy. Her first
child was born healthy. Both pregnancies were high-risk
because she is an insulin-dependent diabetic. Her primary
obstetrician was Dr. Patricia McConnell, a member of the Peden
Group, an obstetrics practice group based out of Lankenau
Hospital (“Lankenau”). Lankenau is part of the Main Line
Health system and located in Wynnewood, Pennsylvania.
Because of Mrs. Torretti’s diabetic condition (which can
present complications during a pregnancy), Dr. McConnell
referred her to the Paoli Hospital Perinatal Testing Center
(“Paoli”), located in Paoli, Pennsylvania, for monitoring
throughout both pregnancies. Paoli is a center for fetal
monitoring and consultation only, and is located in a medical
building adjacent to Paoli Hospital. It is also owned by Main
Line Health. The two hospitals are approximately twenty miles
apart.

1

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this
EMTALA action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, et seq., and
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
4

In Mrs. Torretti’s third trimester, she began to have
complications, primarily involving premature contractions.
During this period, the Peden Group increased Mrs. Torretti’s
monitoring appointments at Paoli to twice per week from once
per month. The Peden Group also monitored her as an
outpatient at Lankenau on one occasion in mid-April 2005. Two
weeks later, when she went to Paoli for routine monitoring on
April 30, the Paoli medical staff detected that she was
experiencing pre-term labor and directed her to Lankenau where
she was hospitalized for three days. On that occasion, she drove
herself from Paoli to Lankenau.
Near the end of Mrs. Torretti’s pregnancy, in her 34th
week, she had a routine monitoring appointment scheduled at
Paoli on Monday, May 23. Two days before the appointment,
she called Dr. McConnell twice. First, she complained of
contractions. Dr. McConnell told her to put her feet up and
relax. The second time Mrs. Torretti called, the contractions had
lessened, but she explained that she was very uncomfortable
because of her large size and had noticed a decrease in fetal
movement. She asked about the possibility of receiving a
therapeutic amniocentesis, a treatment to reduce her discomfort
by removing some of the excess amniotic fluid. Dr. McConnell
advised her to drink a glass of ice water to try and stir the baby;
thereafter, for whatever reason, Mrs. Torretti detected increased
movement. The doctor also told her that she could come to
Lankenau if she preferred, but that nothing could be done until
Monday. Mrs. Torretti chose not to go the hospital that
5

weekend and did not believe that her condition was emergent.2
On May 23, the Torrettis drove to Paoli for the
appointment, which included a routine ultrasound and a fetal
non-stress test.3 When Mrs. Torretti arrived at Paoli, she was
feeling general discomfort, primarily because of the strain on
her back from the large size of her abdomen. She was not
alarmed about her condition and did not feel that she was in an
emergent state.4 She told Dr. Andrew Gerson, a perinatologoist
on Paoli’s staff, about her conversation with Dr. McConnell
over the weekend—that she was having a great deal of
discomfort mainly due to her large size and had noticed a
decrease in fetal movement, but that there was still some
movement.
Dr. Gerson sat Mrs. Torretti in a chair and began the nonstress test. Over a 28-minute period, the test did not show
expected fetal heart rate variability—normal accelerations and
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See App. 97 (Question: “Did you feel your condition was
emergent on the 21st?” Mrs. Torretti’s answer: “No.”).
3

A non-stress test is a non-invasive test that measures fetal
heart rate and contractions.
Dr. Andrew Gerson, a
perinatologist, explained that the test can last anywhere from 20
minutes to more than two hours, depending on the person.
4

See App. 101a (Question: “Did you feel your condition was
emergent that day [at Paoli]?” Mrs. Torretti’s answer: “No.”).
6

decelerations. Lack of variability in a non-stress test could be
explained by a normal variant, such as a prolonged sleep cycle,
or could be the sign of a problem. About the same time Mrs.
Torretti began the non-stress test, her contractions returned. She
indicated the “pain was so bad” that she was “grasping either the
arm of the chair or both arms of the chair at once, and either
almost grunting or to a degree yelling.” The non-stress test
indicated that she had 16 contractions in the 28 minutes of fetal
monitoring—her contractions lasted approximately 50 to 70
seconds and were 1½ to 2½ minutes apart.
Dr. Gerson was aware of Mrs. Torretti’s diabetic
condition. He noted in her medical documents that her
abdominal circumference was large—“off the charts.” The fetus
weighed approximately eleven pounds. Also, the ultrasound test
indicated that she had excess amniotic fluid, but that the fetus
“was moving its limbs and body.”
Based on these preliminary test results and Mrs.
Torretti’s diabetic condition, Dr. Gerson terminated the nonstress test and sent her to Lankenau for longer-term monitoring
of the baby.5 In directing Mrs. Torretti to Lankenau, he also

5

Dr. Gerson stated that “one of the other concerns was [that
Mrs. Torretti] be evaluated for her own sugar status and diabetes
status, which, again, was one of the factors that made me realize
that I thought she was going to [a] need more prolonged period
of monitoring than what we could provide for her.”
7

consulted with her regular doctor, Dr. McConnell, by telephone.
Dr. Gerson testified that this plan appeared to be “perfectly safe”
based on the “best information we had.” He further testified
that, even though she was having contractions, which had been
commonplace throughout her third trimester, “delivery wasn’t
necessarily going to be imminent or need to be imminent and [
] it was appropriate for her to go to Lankenau Hospital.” 6 The
nurse assisting Dr. Gerson commented to Mrs. Torretti that she
believed Mrs. Torretti might deliver the baby sometime that day,
but gave no indication of an emergency or imminency.
Mrs. Torretti testified that, while at Paoli, nothing in the
statements or demeanor of anyone on Paoli’s staff, including Dr.
Gerson, indicated to her that her condition was emergent. For
example, Mrs. Torretti stated that “[t]here was no [ ] urgency,
though, as far as I was concerned. [The nurse] seemed pretty
calm, and that’s usually a pretty good indicator” because “I
could usually read [the nurse] pretty well, I had known her since
I had been pregnant with my first child.” In addition, when Dr.
Gerson discontinued the monitoring and sent her to Lankenau
for prolonged monitoring, Mr. Torretti asked whether it was an
emergency and if they should go in an ambulance. Dr. Gerson
replied that it was not that urgent and that an ambulance was not
necessary. Nonetheless, he requested that they go directly to

6

Dr. McConnell confirmed this view in testifying that Dr.
Gerson told her that Mrs. Torretti would need prolonged
monitoring, but that he did not anticipate a delivery that day.
8

Lankenau. En route to Lankenau, however, they stopped at their
home. With the stop, the 20-mile trip took them approximately
45 minutes door-to-door.
As is customary, Dr. Gerson sent an explanatory letter to
the Lankenau medical personnel along with the Torrettis. When
Mrs. Torretti arrived, she had to wait approximately 15 to 20
minutes for a room. She stated that when she was first
connected to the monitor, her condition seemed to be about the
same as it had been at Paoli, but then “it worsened very
quickly.” Shortly thereafter, another doctor with the Peden
Group checked on her. When he looked at the preliminary
results, he exclaimed “oh shit!” The doctors immediately rushed
Mrs. Torretti into surgery and she gave birth via caesarean
section. The baby, Christopher Torretti, was born with severe
brain damage.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the
EMTALA claim. The District Court ruled that the Torrettis did
not offer sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference that
defendants, specifically Dr. Gerson, knew Mrs. Torretti
presented a medical emergency, and thus failed to sustain their
burden under EMTALA. Torretti v. Paoli Mem. Hosp., No. 063003, 2008 WL 268066, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2008).
Accordingly, it granted the motion for summary judgment,
dismissing the only federal claim. It also declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the Torrettis’ remaining state
claims.
9

II.

Standard of Review

When the District Court grants a motion for summary
judgment, our review is plenary. See Elsmere Park Club, L.P.
v. Town of Elsmere, 542 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine
issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). “We resolve all factual doubts and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of [ ] the nonmoving
party.” See DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506
F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). We may affirm
or vacate the District Court’s judgment on any grounds
supported by the record. Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
III.

EMTALA Background

EMTALA requires hospitals to give certain types of
medical care to individuals presented for emergency treatment:
(a) appropriate medical screening, (b) stabilization of known
emergency medical conditions and labor, and (c) restrictions on
transfer of unstabilized individuals to outside hospital facilities.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)–(c) 7 ; see Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523,

7

The statute states in pertinent part:
(a) Medical screening requirement
10

In the case of a hospital that has a hospital
emergency department, if any individual (whether
or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter)
comes to the emergency department and a request
is made on the individual's behalf for examination
or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital
must provide for an appropriate medical screening
examination within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department, including ancillary
services routinely available to the emergency
department, to determine whether or not an
emergency medical condition (within the meaning
of subsection (e)(1) of this section) exists.
(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency
medical conditions and labor
(1)
In
general[:]
If
any
individual . . . comes to a hospital and the hospital
determines that the individual has an emergency
medical condition, the hospital must provide
either—
(A) within the staff and facilities
available at the hospital, for such
further medical examination and
such treatment as may be required
to stabilize the medical condition,
or
(B) for transfer of the individual to
another m edical facility in
accordance with subsection (c) of
11

525 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that a hospital has two primary
obligations under EMTALA: (1) if an individual arrives at an
emergency room, the hospital must provide appropriate medical
screening to determine whether an emergency medical condition
exists; and (2) if the hospital determines an individual has an
emergency medical condition that has not been stabilized, it may
not transfer the patient unless certain conditions are met).
Congress enacted EMTALA in the mid-1980s based on
concerns that, due to economic constraints, hospitals either were
refusing to treat certain emergency room patients or transferring
them to other institutions. See 68 F.R. 53,222, 53,223 (Sept. 9,
2003); see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-241, pt.3, at 27 (July 31,
1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 605 (indicating that
Congress was “greatly concerned about the increasing number
of reports that hospital emergency rooms are refusing to accept
or treat patients with emergency conditions if the patient does
not have medical insurance”). As noted above, this practice is

this section.
....
(c) Restricting transfers until individual stabilized
(1) Rule[:] If an individual at a hospital has
an emergency medical condition which has not
been stabilized (within the meaning of subsection
(e)(3)(B) of this section), the hospital may not
transfer the individual unless . . . . [considerations
not applicable to this case.]
12

known as “patient dumping.” Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass’n,
42 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994). EMTALA requires hospitals
to provide medical screening and stabilizing treatment to
individuals seeking emergency care in a nondiscriminatory
manner.8 Although Congress was concerned that the indigent
and uninsured tended to be the primary victims of patient
dumping, EMTALA is not limited to these individuals. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd; see also Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.,
525 U.S. 249, 252 (1999) (holding that EMTALA does not
require a plaintiff to show “that the hospital’s inappropriate
stabilization resulted from an improper motive such as one
involving the indigency, race, or sex of the patient”).
There is no general common-law duty for hospitals to
accept and treat all individuals. Under EMTALA, however, any
individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a
hospital’s violation of the statute may bring a private civil action
for damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d). While an EMTALA

8

Hospitals that voluntarily participate in the Medicare or
Medicaid programs and have effective provider agreements
must comply with EMTALA. In re Univ. Med. Ctr., 973 F.2d
1065, 1083 (3d Cir. 1992). When medical personnel working
for a hospital violate EMTALA, that hospital is subject to
liability for those violations “[b]ecause hospitals can act and
know things only vicariously through individuals.” Burditt v.
HHS, 934 F.2d 1362, 1374 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal citation
omitted).
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action usually will be brought in conjunction with a state
statutory claim or common-law medical malpractice or
negligence action arising out of the same events, it does not
create a federal cause of action for malpractice. See, e.g.,
Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132, 1137
(8th Cir. 1996); Brooks v. Md. Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708,
710, 713 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that EMTALA “does not create
liability for malpractice based upon breach of national or
community standard of care”).
Liability is determined
independently of whether any deficiencies in the screening or
treatment provided by the hospital may be actionable as
negligence or malpractice, see Summers, 91 F.3d at 1137, as the
statute was aimed at disparate patient treatment.
IV.

Outpatients Do Not Trigger EMTALA Coverage

In analyzing an EMTALA claim, the Act does not stand
alone. The Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) promulgated a
Federal Regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)–(b),9 and Final Rule,
68 F.R. 53,222 (Sept. 9, 2003),10 clarifying the reach of

9

Titled “Special responsibilities of Medicare hospitals in
emergency cases.”
10

Titled “Medicare Program; Clarifying Policies Related to
the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating Hospitals in
Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical Conditions.”
14

EMTALA. See Brian Kamoie, EMTALA: Dedicating an
Emergency Department Near You, 37 J. Health L. 41, at 55–56
(2004) (explaining that because of confusion in the
interpretation and application of EMTALA, CMS set up a
“Regulatory Reform Task Force” to recommend clarifications
to the statute). Generally, we defer to a government agency’s
administrative interpretation of a statute unless it is contrary to
clear congressional intent. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural
Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 & n.9, n.11
(1984) (noting that when an agency with the power to construe
a statute has provided a construction, we defer to that
interpretation if it is “permissible”); see also Mercy Home
Health v. Leavitt, 436 F.3d 370, 378 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining
the Chevron deference test). “The court need not conclude that
the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could
have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the
court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in
a judicial proceeding.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11. Where
Congress expressly delegates to an agency the power to construe
a statute, we review the agency’s interpretation under the
“arbitrary and capricious” standard; where the delegation is
implicit, the agency’s interpretation must be “reasonable.” Id.
at 843–44.
CMS has the congressional authority to promulgate rules
and regulations interpreting and implementing Medicare-related
statutes such as EMTALA. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1302,
1395hh; 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq. Among the 2003 clarifications,
15

the Regulation and Final Rule address where and when
EMTALA applies. CMS solicited public comments and took
into account a range of objections to the proposed Regulation,
providing a lengthy discussion responding to the comments and
its reasons for its interpretation in the Final Rule. The
Regulation was not raised by the parties or the District Court.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to answer the question before us:
whether Mrs. Torretti fits within EMTALA’s scope—a patient
antidumping statute. CMS has concluded that EMTALA does
not apply to patients (and outpatients), which interpretation
precludes the Torrettis’ EMTALA claim in the first instance
because Mrs. Torretti was an outpatient who came to Paoli for
a scheduled appointment.
Turning to the Regulation’s interpretation of the statute,
EMTALA’s requirements are triggered when an “individual
comes to the emergency department.” 11
42 C.F.R.

11

Cf. Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 173–76 (1st Cir.
1999) (explaining that subsections (a) (screening) and (b)
(stablilization) of EMTALA should be read in the disjunctive
because (a) uses the term “emergency department” and (b) uses
the term “hospital,” and concluding that transferring an infant
born in the maternity ward with an emergent condition to
another hospital with specialized care without stabilization
would qualify as a claim under EMTALA). We note that this
case came before CMS’s 2003 clarifying Regulation and Final
Rule. We do not attempt to speculate at how the First Circuit
16

§

489.24(a)(1). 1 2

To

parse

out

this

clause,

an

Court of Appeals would view this question in light of the
revised Regulation, but in the Court’s analysis it noted that the
EMTALA “provisions create distinct obligations and apply to
different classes of individuals.” Id. at 175. We also note that
a “labor and delivery department,” where the baby in Lopez-Soto
was born and transferred from, is considered to be a “dedicated
emergency department” under the Regulation and Final Rule
and thus falls under EMTALA, whereas Paoli’s Perinatal
Testing Center is for outpatient fetal monitoring and consulting
only. See 68 F.R. at 53,229–30 (explaining that EMTALA
coverage applies to “labor and delivery departments” because
they “provide care for emergency medical conditions on an
urgent, nonappointment basis”).
As was the Lopez-Soto Court’s focus, CMS pointed out
that the nomenclature discrepancies in the statute have led to
confusion and the uneven application of EMTALA. See 68 F.R.
at 53,227–228; see also Kamoie, 37 J. Health L. at 46–47,
51–52. By focusing EMTALA obligations across methods of
classification, such as by distinguishing between hospital
patients and other individuals who come to the hospital, CMS
attempted to clarify the statute. See 68 F.R. at 53,224 (“We
proposed to clarify the extent to which EMTALA applies to
inpatients and outpatients. We believe these clarifications will
enhance understanding for hospitals as to what their obligations
are under EMTALA, so that they more clearly understand to
whom they are obligated under this provision of the statute, and
whose care will be governed by the Medicare hospital
[conditions of participation].”).
17

12

The pertinent part of subsection (a) of the Regulation states:
(a) Applicability of provisions of this section.
(1) In the case of a hospital that has an emergency
department, if an individual (whether or not
eligible for Medicare benefits and regardless of
ability to pay) “comes to the emergency
department,” as defined in paragraph (b) of this
section, the hospital must—
(i) Provide an appropriate medical screening
examination within the capability of the hospital’s
emergency department, including ancillary
services routinely available to the emergency
department, to determine whether or not an
emergency medical condition exists.
The
examination must be conducted by an
individual(s) who is determined qualified by
hospital bylaws or rules and regulations and who
meets the requirements of § 482.55 of this chapter
concerning emergency services personnel and
direction; and
(ii) If an emergency medical condition is
determined to exist, provide any necessary
stabilizing treatment, as defined in paragraph (d)
of this section, or an appropriate transfer as
defined in paragraph (e) of this section. If the
hospital admits the individual as an inpatient for
further treatment, the hospital’s obligation under
this section ends, as specified in paragraph (d)(2)
18

“individual” only “comes to the emergency department” if that
person is not already a “patient.” See id. § 489.24(b); see also
68 F.R. at 53,238 (explaining that because “outpatients” “are
patients of the hospital already, we believe it is inappropriate
that they be considered to have ‘come to the hospital’ for
purposes of EMTALA”). The Regulation defines “patient” for
our purposes as “[a]n individual who has begun to receive
outpatient services as part of an encounter, as defined in § 410.2
of this chapter, other than an encounter that the hospital is
obligated by this section to provide.” 13 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b).
CMS explains that EMTALA does not apply to
outpatients, even if during an outpatient encounter “they are
later found to have an emergency medical condition . . . [and]
are transported to the hospital’s dedicated emergency
department.” 68 F.R. at 53,240 (pertinent section titled
“Applicability of EMTALA: Individuals Present at an Area of
the Hospital’s Main Campus Other than the Dedicated
Emergency Department” that corresponds with 42 C.F.R.
of this section.
42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a).
13

“Outpatient means a person who has not been admitted as
an inpatient but who is registered on the hospital or CAH
[critical access hospital] records as an outpatient and receives
services (rather than supplies alone) directly from the hospital or
CAH.” 42 C.F.R. § 410.2.
19

§ 489.24(b)); see also id. at 53,243, 53,247 (“[W]e
are . . . [a]dopting as final the proposed definition of
patient . . . to reflect the nonapplicability of EMTALA to an
individual who has begun to receive outpatient services at an
encounter at the hospital other than an encounter that the
hospital is obligated by EMTALA to provide.”).
“These
individuals are considered patients of the hospital and are
protected by [Medicare’s Conditions of Participation] and
relevant State law,” as well as “under general rules of ethics
governing the medical profession.” Id. at 53,238–40 14 ; see also

14

The pertinent part of the CMS Final Rule states:
EMTALA does not apply to any individual who,
before the individual presents to the hospital for
examination or treatment for an emergency
medical condition, has begun to receive outpatient
services as part of an encounter . . . . Such
individuals would be included under this policy,
regardless of whether or not they began the
nonemergency encounter in order to keep a
previously scheduled appointment or under orders
o f a p h ysic ia n o r o th e r m e dica l
practitioner. . . . [W]e believe it is inappropriate to
consider such individuals, who are hospital
outpatients who have protections under the
[Medicare Conditions of Participation], to have
“come to the hospital” for purposes of EMTALA
as well, even if they subsequently experience an
20

Kamoie, 37 J. Health L. at 51–52.
The Torrettis argue that EMTALA is triggered because
Mrs. Torretti came to Paoli for “what was, from the inception,
a potential ‘emergency medical condition’” because “EMTALA
protects people who present ‘for what may be an emergency
medical condition.’” Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 2 (quoting 68 F.R.
53,222) (emphasis added). This is not supported in the record.
Mrs. Torretti came to Paoli for her scheduled bi-weekly
appointment involving routine monitoring of her high-risk
pregnancy and did not present as an emergency to the Paoli
medical staff.15 In fact, she testified that, because of her
complications throughout her third trimester, she did not believe

emergency medical condition.
15

We note, however, that EMTALA could be triggered in a
circumstance where an individual comes to the hospital
requesting treatment for an emergent condition, despite having
a pre-scheduled appointment within the hospital for a related or
unrelated reason. See 68 F.R. at 53,241; id. at 53,237 (“[I]f [an]
individual [sent to a hospital for specific diagnostic tests] were
to tell the hospital staff at the laboratory or radiology department
that he or she needed emergency care, EMTALA would
apply.”). As we discussed above, that is not the situation here
and would require a different analysis. There is a narrow
exception where an individual need not request emergency care,
but Mrs. Torretti also does not fit under this exception, and we
do not discuss it in more detail.
21

she was in an emergent state until after she began the
monitoring at Lankenau and her condition quickly changed. Her
other actions and testimony, as well as the testimony of her
husband and the medical personnel, are consistent with this
view.
Contrary to the Torrettis’ contention on appeal, Mrs.
Torretti’s statements to Dr. Gerson near the beginning of the
appointment (describing her discomfort due to her large size and
her conversations with Dr. McConnell over the weekend) do not
amount to presenting an emergency.
At any medical
appointment, we would expect medical personnel attending to
a patient to request pertinent medical information, and, in turn,
expect that a patient share such information concerning the
perceived state of her health, which is precisely what Mrs.
Torretti did in this case. This type of routine patient-doctor
dialogue does not transform a pre-scheduled medical
appointment into an emergent situation triggering EMTALA.
The Torrettis also imply that, regardless of whether Mrs.
Torretti was a “patient,” because she had a high-risk pregnancy,
each scheduled visit to Paoli during her pregnancy would
qualify as a presentment of an emergency medical condition to
trigger EMTALA coverage. Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 3 (“Mrs.
Torretti came to [Paoli] for what was, from the inception, a
potential ‘emergency medical condition.’ As the fetus of a
woman who has been an insulin-dependent diabetic since
infancy, her baby was at serious risk of stillbirth or fetal death.”)
22

(citation omitted). This is an unreasonable interpretation of the
Act that broadens its scope beyond Congress’s intent. To
illustrate this point, individuals in equivalent situations to Mrs.
Torretti would be hospital outpatients who have routinely
scheduled weekly or monthly appointments to receive dialysis
or chemotherapy for treatment of kidney disease and cancer,
respectively. We believe it is clear that Congress did not intend
EMTALA to cover these individuals every time they come to
the hospital for their appointments, even though they suffer from
serious medical conditions that risk becoming emergent.
Given this context, we believe CMS’s more restrictive
interpretation on this issue is consistent with EMTALA, and is
in accord with the Act’s intent. Congress passed EMTALA to
curb the problem of patient dumping by creating a statutory duty
for hospitals to examine and treat individuals who come to them
for emergency care. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. Accordingly, this
interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. See Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843; see also Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 504 (1983) (noting agency
regulations interpreting a statute “will often suffice to clarify a
standard with an otherwise uncertain scope”).
One final note on this issue is that in supplemental
briefing the Torrettis point to a Ninth Circuit Court case,
Arlington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2001), and
argue that CMS has taken an “expansive approach” to the phrase
“comes to the emergency department,” which triggers
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EMTALA. Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 1. Arlington was issued
prior to the 2003 Final Rule and revised Regulation that clarified
the treatment of outpatients under the statute by revising the
definition of “patient,” which is the significant issue here. The
“expansive approach” to which the Arlington court refers
broadens the definition of the phrase “comes to the emergency
department” to include other parts of the hospital, such as
“hospital property-sidewalks,” which is not determinative in this
case. See Arlington, 237 F.3d 1071–72 (addressing whether
under EMTALA “hospitals must admit emergency patients who
are being transported to the hospital in non-hospital owned
ambulances,” and noting that “[t]he [R]egulation answers this
question”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b) (explaining that if an
individual is not a “patient,” that individual “comes to the
emergency department” within the meaning of the statute under
four circumstances).
In this circumstance, the Torrettis will have to pursue
legal avenues other than EMTALA because the statute does not
apply here. Moreover, claims of negligence or malpractice more
accurately reflect the relief the Torrettis seek.
V.

Summary Judgment

Although we have concluded that Mrs. Torretti’s
circumstances are not those contemplated by EMTALA
coverage, we would be remiss if we did not address the
substance of the claim for future guidance. The Torrettis
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alleged a “stabilization” claim—that defendants violated
EMTALA because they did not stabilize her emergency
condition and inappropriately transferred her. Under this theory,
EMTALA requires that Mrs. Torretti (1) had “an emergency
medical condition; (2) the hospital actually knew of that
condition; [and] (3) the patient was not stabilized before being
transferred.” Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 883
(4th Cir. 1992). The District Court dismissed the claim on
summary judgment because the Torrettis could not show that
defendants had actual knowledge of an emergency medical
condition. “The Act does not hold hospitals accountable for
failing to stabilize conditions of which they are not aware, or
even conditions of which they should have been aware.”
Vickers v. Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 78 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir.
1996) (citing Baber, 977 F.2d at 883) (indicating that
“EMTALA would otherwise become coextensive with
malpractice claims for negligent treatment”).
As the District Court concluded, the requirement of
actual knowledge is the key to this issue. We adopt this mens
rea condition precedent, which conforms with all our sister
circuit courts of appeals that have addressed this issue under
EMTALA. See, e.g., Vickers, 78 F.3d at 141; Eberhardt v. City
of Los Angeles, 62 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1995); Holcomb v.
Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994); Gatewood v.
Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d
266, 271 (6th Cir. 1990); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1).
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When we discussed EMTALA at the outset, we indicated that it
was not intended to create a federal malpractice statute or cover
cases of hospital negligence. Thus, the actual knowledge
element comports with Congress’s intent in passing the Act.
The District Court concluded that the Torrettis’ evidence
was not sufficient to raise a disputed issue, and we agree with
that conclusion. As we outlined above in the fact section, there
is no evidence that any of the hospital staff at Paoli, and
specifically Dr. Gerson, actually knew that Mrs. Torretti’s
condition was an emergency before directing her to Lankenau
for further monitoring. The medical personnel at Paoli knew her
pregnancy was high-risk because of her diabetic condition,
which was indicated in her medical charts and the Paoli testing
results from that day, and she had a recent history of treatment
for pre-term labor and contractions similar to those exhibited at
Paoli (and approximately three weeks prior to the May 23
appointment, medical personnel at Paoli sent her to Lankenau
for further monitoring). She arrived for a routine appointment
and did not present herself as an emergency patient, neither she
nor Dr. McConnell believed her situation was emergent over the
weekend preceding the Paoli appointment, she did not believe
her condition was emergent until after she arrived at Lankenau
and her condition changed quickly, Dr. Gerson did not indicate
that he believed her condition was emergent (e.g., before Mrs.
Torretti left Paoli, he expressly stated to the contrary when
asked about transporting her to Lankenau in an ambulance and
when he spoke to Dr. McConnell about further monitoring at
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Lankenau), none of the other hospital staff indicated her
condition was emergent (e.g., Mrs. Torretti’s testimony conveys
that the nurse at Paoli commented that Mrs. Torretti might
deliver the baby sometime that day, but did not suggest it was
imminent or the situation was an emergency), and the Torrettis’
expert report is unreliable to the extent that it opines on the
element of actual knowledge.16
One of the Torrettis’ experts,

16

Mrs. Torretti’s testimony that, near the end of her
ultrasound, she heard Dr. Gerson state that “it had a score of
two,” is not enough to raise a disputed issue of material fact.
She believed the number referred to her biophysical profile
score, though she did not state any reasons for this belief. That
profile measures the health of the baby using both an ultrasound
and a non-stress test. The corresponding score ranges from 0,
which is very problematic, to 10, which is the best score.
Dr. Gerson testified that he was not able to conduct a
formal biophysical profile, but that the ultrasound showed
both gross body movements and limb movements,
as well as [excess] fluid around the baby[, which]
allowed me to come to the conclusion that the
baby had a biophysical profile score of 6, which
is a profile score that allows one to draw a
conclusion that delivery wasn’t necessarily going
to be imminent or need to be imminent and that it
was appropriate for her to go to Lankenau.
This number is corroborated in Mrs. Torretti’s medical report,
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Dr. Steven A. Klein, a fetal medicine specialist, stated in his
undated first report that Dr. Gerson “should have urgently sent
her to the nearest OB facility (Paoli Hospital)” and “not to do so
was below the standard of care.” These statements opine only
on malpractice or negligence and not the actual knowledge
standard under EMTALA. Dr. Klein added in his second report,
attached to the opposition to summary judgment, that he
believed Dr. Gerson knew Mrs. Torretti’s condition was
emergent. He based this opinion on several facts contained in
his two reports about Mrs. Torretti’s condition while at Paoli.
One of those facts—that “[M]rs. Torretti complained of NO
fetal movements for 2 days”—is not supported in the record.
Mrs. Torretti testified that she complained of reduced, not
absent, fetal movements over the weekend prior to the Paoli
appointment, and was able to stir the baby when she called Dr.
McConnell the second time. Dr. McConnell testified to this as
well, and Mrs. Torretti’s medical report from Paoli indicates the
same. Thus, regardless how we view the ability of medical

which states that the biophysical profile score is 6. It is also
consistent with Dr. Gerson’s actions in sending Mrs. Torretti to
Lankenau for further monitoring. Moreover, the letter Dr.
Gerson sent to Lankenau indicated that, based on her ultrasound,
“the placenta was found in the Posterior position and noted to be
grade 2.” This information is consistent with the statement Mrs.
Torretti overheard Dr. Gerson make during the ultrasound. As
the District Court concluded, Mrs. Torretti’s speculation alone,
without more, is insufficient to survive summary judgment.
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experts to opine on the element of actual knowledge of another,
we need not answer that question because here Dr. Klein’s
reports are not sufficient to create a disputed issue of material
fact.
*****
In this context, we affirm the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment.
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